The numbers behind the slowdown
ABSL's 2026 report on Poland's business services sector puts employment at 500,500 people at the end of Q1 2026, spread across 2,179 service centres run by 1,303 companies. Growth was 1.8% year on year, about 8,860 jobs. The sector now accounts for 6.1% of Polish GDP and 7.8% of enterprise-sector employment.
That top line looks healthy. The composition underneath is the story.
Of those 8,860 new jobs, only 3,240 came from newly opened centres. Forty-six new centres opened in 2025 and four in the first quarter of 2026, the slowest pace of new openings in a decade. Poland is no longer winning the site-selection race it dominated from 2012 to 2021. It is growing by deepening what is already there, which is a completely different commercial and hiring problem.
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What "qualitative growth" means when you are the one hiring
The industry phrase for this is a move from cost centre to capability hub, and it gets repeated at every conference in Kraków until it means nothing. Translated into hiring terms, it means three concrete shifts.
First, the work coming into Polish centres is higher up the value chain than it was five years ago: financial planning rather than accounts payable, product ownership rather than ticket triage, model governance rather than data entry. Second, the entry-level intake that used to absorb thousands of graduates a year has thinned, because that tier of work is the tier automation ate first. Third, the skills profile a centre needs has become far more specific, which makes each hire slower and each mis-hire more expensive.
You can see the second point in the ABSL data if you read it sideways. Employment grew 1.8% while the value of services delivered grew considerably faster. That gap is productivity, and productivity in a services centre means fewer people doing more, which nobody puts on a recruitment poster.
Here is the uncomfortable version for anyone running graduate intake in Poland: the model where you hired 200 economics graduates a year, put them on invoice processing, and promoted the good ones into analyst roles after eighteen months has stopped working. The bottom rung of that ladder has been automated away, and most centres have not built a replacement. They just recruit fewer graduates and hope the mid-level market supplies them, which it will not, because everyone is doing the same thing.
Kraków, Warsaw, and the tier-two cities
Kraków remains the largest single location, with close to 108,000 people across 312 centres. Warsaw, Wrocław, Tri-City and Katowice make up most of the rest, and the tier-two cities (Łódź, Poznań, Lublin, Rzeszów, Bydgoszcz) have been the quiet growth story.
The trade-off is not what most site-selection decks say it is. The usual pitch is that a tier-two city gives you 15% to 25% lower salary costs and lower attrition. The salary part is real and shrinking. The attrition part is real and durable, and it is the more valuable half.
What the decks understate is depth. In Kraków you can replace a senior treasury analyst in six weeks because eight other centres employ them. In Rzeszów you might be looking at four months and a relocation package. For a centre with 400 people and a broad skills mix, that risk is manageable. For a specialist unit of 40 where three people hold the domain knowledge, it is not.
| Location profile | Salary index | Typical attrition | Replacement speed, senior specialist | Best fit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kraków, Warsaw | 100 | 14% to 18% | 4 to 8 weeks | Large multi-tower centres, scarce specialisms |
| Wrocław, Tri-City, Katowice | 88 to 95 | 12% to 16% | 6 to 12 weeks | Engineering-heavy hubs, second-site strategies |
| Łódź, Poznań, Lublin, Rzeszów | 78 to 88 | 8% to 12% | 10 to 18 weeks | Stable process work, long-tenure teams |
Treat the salary index as directional. It moves with role family, and for AI and data engineering roles the spread between Kraków and a tier-two city narrows to almost nothing, because those people price against remote work in Western Europe rather than against the local market.
Ukraine, and the thing nobody puts in the deck
Poland's labour supply since 2022 has been shaped by Ukrainian migration in a way the official sector reports handle carefully and private conversations handle bluntly. A substantial share of the growth in Polish delivery capacity over the past four years came from Ukrainian professionals, particularly in engineering and Russian and Ukrainian language support.
Any workforce plan for a Polish centre that runs to 2030 has to hold two scenarios: one where a large part of that population stays and integrates permanently, and one where a meaningful share returns. Most plans I have seen assume the first and have no answer for the second. It is not a comfortable planning conversation and it is a necessary one, particularly for centres whose language coverage depends on it.